Kosmas Savvas Panagiotidis, Η οργάνωση του στρατού κατά την ύστερη βυζαντινή περίοδο (1204-1453), Ph.D. Dissertation, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Thessaloniki 2004, pp. 249

Kosmas Panagiotidis is a historian, who did his PhD in the Faculty of History and Archaeology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki. His thesis presents the organization of the Byzantine army in the Late Period. It attempts to complete the work of Mark C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army. Arms and Society, 1204-1453, Philadelphia 1992, which does not cover topics, such as provincial military forces, city guards, military catalogues, age, mobilization of military forces, recruitment of mercenaries, and their payroll, special categories of soldiers, auxiliary personnel, military officials, logistics, etc. The dissertation also tries to complement the monography of Raymond Guilland, Recherches sur les institutions byzantines [Berliner Byzantinistische Arbeiten 35], vol. I-II, Berlin-Amsterdam 1967, which deals with the military offices, among other ones.

The dissertation has five chapters and an epilogue. The first chapter is about the administrative organization of the army. The author argues that the themata, mentioned in the Late Byzantine sources, are not related to the existence of military units. Instead, the megala allagia were the largest military administrations during the period 1286-1355, stationed in areas of the Empire with a defensive value. Panagiotidis adopts Ioannis Karayannopoulos’ aspect on that, found in the book Συμβολή στο πρόβλημα της στρατιωτικής «πρόνοιας» κατά την εποχή των Παλαιολόγων (Εταιρεία Βυζαντινών Ερευνών 16), Thessaloniki 1998, which is the augmented translated version of Karayannopoulos’ work “Ein Beitrag zur Militärpronoia der Palaiologenzeit,” in: Geschichte und Kultur der Palaiologenzeit. Referate des Internationalen Symposions zu Ehren von H. Hunger, edited by W. Seibt, Wien 1996, pp. 71-89. Furthermore, Panagiotidis describes the provincial forces and the cities’ garrisons, and the way they were functioning. According to him, the empire had units, staffed with local soldiers, stationed in the provinces (he defines the province as an administrative area), especially in Thrace and Macedonia. Those units were responsible for the defense of the city and of the wider region, and, sometimes, when they were close to the operations sites, they were joining the main expeditionary army. The political-military administration of the province where the units were established seems to have been in charge of them, according to the author.

The second chapter refers to the conscription. One of the main findings of the author is that the draft was occasional, occurred only in case of an imminent operation. The third chapter has to do with the recruitment of mercenaries. The researcher explains the reasons the Byzantines were hiring mercenaries and the way they were paying them. The fourth chapter describes the special categories of soldiers and the auxiliary personnel. The writer argues that the sources mention individually the kataphracts, heavily armed soldiers, and that they were not an organized unit, as was the case in previous centuries. More often the texts attest the light soldiers, who were forming the light armed units. Furthermore, the writer demonstrates that the inhabitants of areas close to war hotspots, as well as some other groups of society, such as the farmers, were also participating in the defense of the fortresses, and, sometimes, took part in armed confrontations. The auxiliary personnel of the army served the soldiers and the officials, but, some of its groups, such as the Tzouloukones, have been occasionally involved in war events, as the sources mention. The fifth chapter lists the persons who lead the army (it excludes the emperors), and it is divided into two sub-categories: military officials, and non-military officials who have assumed military duties. Under the first sub-category, there are officials, whose offices were created in the previous centuries and evolved in the late era, such as that of megas domestikos, and officials with offices attested only in the Late Era, such as megas konostaulos. The author concludes that these offices, except for megas domestikos, do not seem to have permanent service and were bestowed to individuals each time according to the operational needs. The second sub-category presents the officials with no military offices yet often participating in military operations and even leading the army. The reason behind that, as the researcher stresses, was that these officials, besides their skills, were in close contact with the emperor or with other important persons of their time. Last, the epilogue summarizes some important conclusions of the chapters.

The strongest point of this treatise is the fact that it gives the reader a comprehensive overview of the structure of the Late Byzantine army (its administration, soldiers and conscription’s matters, the hiring of mercenaries and the way the empire was paying them), and of the officials who took part or led the forces, based primarily on all related Byzantine sources and, secondary, on adequate literature. The chapter that describes the officials has a brief introduction on the term and the functions of each office in the centuries prior to Late Byzantine era. However, the chapter refers only to the persons that hold the office, without any prosopographical analysis, such as the origin of the official and whether this had to do with the place where he campaigned, the reason the emperor chose him, etc.

The dissertation is useful to the researchers of the Late Byzantine warfare, especially to those dealing with the army’s infrastructure and interested in specific army units or individuals. It is not published as a book, but it can be accessed online for free. As it is specialized and written in Greek, the thesis may not attract the attention of a wider audience.