John Haldon, Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204 (Warfare and History), London 1999

John Haldon is Emeritus Shelby Cullom Davis ’30 Professor of European History and Emeritus Professor of Byzantine History and Hellenic Studies at Princeton University. His research interests focus on the political, institutional, socio-economic, and cultural history of the early and middle Byzantium from the seventh to the eleventh centuries, and more. His latest book is: The De Thematibus (‘on the themes’) of Constantine VII Porphyrogenitus. Translated with introductory chapters and detailed notes (Liverpool UP, Liverpool 2021).

The book under review presents the Byzantine warfare from the end of Justinian’s reign (565) until the capture of Constantinople by the crusaders of Western Europe (1204). It describes the Byzantine attitudes towards warfare, the outcomes of war in state and the general population, the relations between the soldiers, their leaders and society, as well as the communications, logistics, resources, and manpower of the Byzantine Empire. The monograph also studies the army during campaign and battle, and its attitudes to violence within the framework of the Byzantine Orthodox Church. The book complements the monograph of Mark C. Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army and Society, 1204-1453 (Philadelphia 1992), and that of Warren Treadgold, Byzantium and its Army, 284-1081 (Stanford, CA, 1995) in the following aspects: Bartusis barely mentions the developments in the army prior to the era he examines and Treadgold focuses mainly on technical issues of the late Roman and Byzantine military organization, such as tactical structure, payment of soldiers and the size of the army.

The book is structured into the introduction and seven chapters following by conclusion remarks and three appendices. In the introduction, the author addresses the questions and the problems of his study, briefly presents his sources, and explains why his book fills a gap in modern literature on Byzantine warfare. Chapter 1 discusses the Byzantine ideology of war and peace. Chapter 2 deals with the theory and practice of strategy and diplomacy and defines which was the “long-term” strategy, as Haldon calls it, and how it was affected by the geopolitical context of the empire and how it evolved. Chapter 3 deals with the way the empire organized its defense during the years under examination and presents certain numerical data on the size of the army in different periods. Chapter 4 studies the organization of the military structures of the empire and their evolution from the armies of comitatenses (seven imperial field armies) and limitanei (frontier units and inland units with security and police duties) of the 6th and 7th centuries to the armies of themata of the 7th to c. 930, and up to the formation of the tagmata (full-time units, infantry and cavalry) and to the organization of the territories into smaller units than themata from around the middle of 10th century until 1204. The chapter also investigates the categories of soldiers from 10th to 12th centuries, their recruitment, their enumeration, and their offensive and defensive equipment. Chapter 5 discusses the logistics and the field support of an army during campaigns, examining the needs of an army when camped and on march. There is one sub-chapter dedicated to the frontier warfare and another one to offensive campaigns and siege warfare. Chapter 6 provides information on how the Byzantine army fought during battles and focuses on the army’s preparation for war, on the methods of organizing itself, and on the way it managed fighting. In both chapters 5 and 6 there are references on tactics. Chapter 7 reveals the impact that the war and the presence of the soldiers had on Byzantine society and how warfare influenced the physical and cultural environment. There is also mention on the representation of war in Byzantine literature, on the social status of the military forces, and on social distinction within the army. The three appendices cover topics such as weights and loads (value of grain, number of animals carrying supplies for soldiers and animals), feeding the army (quantity of grain required for the army and for the animals), and daily rations respectively (how much food field forces of different strength and in different occasions needed).

The central conclusions of this study can be summarized as follows: The Byzantine empire, through a political-theoretical justification, was able to promote ideals of peace and at the same time wage wars and maintain an effective -on most occasions- military system (p. 275). The military administration until the 12th century was far more advanced than any of the empire’s close neighbors and the Islamic states, thanks to the central control over resources and manpower (pp. 276, 279). Byzantine strategy aimed to secure the empire with physical force and to prevent possible offensive actions by making the enemy consider that his losses would be more than his profits (p. 278). The continuous wars had a significant impact on peasants, the majority of the empire’s population that had to maintain the army passing from or fighting in their land (pp. 279-280). Byzantine society evolved and developed by factors related to warfare and was organized for war though it was not a warlike one, according to Haldon (p. 280).

The book’s greatest advantage is the fact that provides details on topics such as the way the empire managed and supplied large-scale operations or the relation between army and society and how the former affected the latter. Therefore, the book is valuable for the researchers of the Byzantine warfare of the early and middle period. Nevertheless, it might be difficult for an audience that lacks general knowledge on Byzantine history to comprehend it.